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PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Instituts Solvay. Travaux de Sociologie. Notes et Mémoires. Misch et Thron, Éditeurs. Bruxelles et Leipzig, 1906. *Fascicule 1. Note sur des Formules d'Introduction à l'Énergétique physio- et psychosociologique.* Par E. SOLVAY. pp. 26. *Fascicule 2. Esquisse d'une Sociologie,* par ÉMILE WAXWEILER. pp. 306. *Fascicule 3. Les Origines Naturelles de la Propriété. Essai de Sociologie Comparée.* Par R. PETRUCCI. pp. xvi+246. *Fascicule 4. Sur quelques Erreurs de Méthode dans l'Étude de l'Homme Primitif. Notes Critiques.* Par LOUIS WODON. pp. 37. *Fascicule 5. L'Aryen et l'Anthroposociologie. Étude Critique.* Par le DR. ÉMILE HOUZÉ. pp. 117. *Fascicule 6. Mesure des Capacités Intellectuelle et Énergétique. Notes d'Analyse statistique.* Par CHARLES HENRY, avec *Remarque additionnelle (Sur l'Interprétation Sociologique de la Distribution des Salaires)* par ÉMILE WAXWEILER. pp. 77.

The number and extent of its publications are an indication of the activity of the recently established "Instituts Solvay," one of the scientific foundations of the Belgian capital. The first monograph, by the founder himself, is an attempt to condense in two mathematical formulæ the physiological expression, on the one hand, and the psychological expression (of organic reactions) on the other, of the life of any given isolated individual, and to indicate the modifications of these formulæ necessary to adapt them to the case of an individual no longer isolated by living in social relations. Society is something more than the sum of a number of individuals and the productive intellectual capacity of each individual is an important interventional factor. The energy of a social group is likewise not newly and purely the sum of the utilizable individual energies of the people composing it. The goal of M. Solvay's sociology is "to reduce to fundamental physico-chemical actions, the *ensemble* of biological and sociological phenomena."

In his "Outlines of Sociology," Emile Waxweiler, who is a professor of the University of Brussels, treats, in the first part, of sociology (adaptation to environment, living *milieu* and social *milieu*, sociological phenomena in comparative sociology) and, in the second, sociological analysis (sources and method, social formation, social aptitudes, activities and synergies). Professor Waxweiler defines "social ethology," or "sociology," since that term already exists, as "the science, or rather, the physiology of the reactional phenomena due to the mutual excitations of individuals of the same species without distinction of sex." The basis of social affinity is the "impression of organic likeness (similitude)," and the evolution of man's nervous system has determined characteristic phenomena from the sociological point of view,—"the faculty of perceiving inter-individually specific likeness of organization proceeds on a par with what is called the manifestations of intelligence, *i. e.*, with the complexity of the nervous system" (p. 74). More and more has man become "the animal formed by the other individuals of his species." The author styles primitive "those men, who, with regard to the greatest mesological complexity attained at a given epoch, have remained at an elementary stage of the development of their sensibility (or, in other words, their

reactional potentiality)," and *civilized*, "those who have put this potentiality in unison with the variety of environmental stimuli."

Sociability, "the human aptitude for social impression," belongs properly to man alone. Prof. Waxweiler accepts the recapitulation theory and holds that "the peoples who have remained close to the initial moment of phyletic evolution are more like the child of the civilized man than like the civilized man himself" (p. 112). The "social personality" of an individual consists of three elements,—"an *ensemble* of physical adaptations, an *ensemble* of psychic adaptations, and a sort of "mental plant" (or stock of tools, etc.),—this might better, perhaps, be termed *idiotropism* than *social personality*. When the individual has completed his education (in *sociability* especially) he has acquired a certain representation of the other individuals of his species, a representation which is "essentially polymorphic" (p. 136). The phenomena of mental parallelism (telepathy) rest upon social synesthesia, leading to coincidence of intuitions. In accordance with the development of man's sensibility and the increase of the social polymorphism due to the intensification of culture, the desire of the like evolves towards a form implying now only occasional and quite elective *rapprochements*. The most complete human type today is, that of the "individual who 'finds himself again' in the least part in a large number of his fellows, towards whom he feels himself drawn by lively impulses, but who does not 'find himself again' completely, or even, in large part, in any one." The only activities of the individual which interest the sociologist are his external activities, and those only in so far as they "produce effectively in another individual of the same species, without distinction of sex, a certain reaction" (p. 169). Activities are distinguished as conjunctive, protective, injurious, competitive, divulgative, gregarious, repetitive, initiative, acquisitive, selective; the social synergies a conformity, interdependence, cephalization, co-ordination, conscience, etc. There is much interesting matter in this volume and the bibliography (pages 297-306, 2 cols. to page) proves the author's wide reading,—he has made good use of the *Pedagogical Seminary* and the writings of American devotees of "child study." But for all this his book is, as he terms it, properly enough, "a sketch." A useful feature is the "sociological dictionary (pages 281-295) containing some 2,200 terms without definitions, of more or less sociological import, gleaned from the vocabulary of the French language.

R. Petrucci's essay in comparative psychology, "The Natural Origins of Property," treats in large measure of the idea of property in the infra-human world of life (pages 1-77) and then, less extensively, of its first developments in man. The earliest form of property is the prey obtained by the unicellular organism by reason of the needs of nutrition. At this biological stage we meet also the permanent or transitory colonial organization of unicellular animals, on which is grafted a sort of primitive form of property of the "family type." Even in the vegetable world, however paradoxical it may seem at first, an analogous state of affairs exists, the possession of the soil by plants individually and collectively constituting "property" of the two kinds in question. The development of these forms of property is traced by the author in the molluscs and worms, insects, arachnids, crustacea, fishes, reptiles and batrachians, birds and mammifers and man (only the primitive hunting and pastoral stages being considered, as they present the simplest forms of human property, and the discussion of the juridical forms of property lies outside the scope of the work). The contrast between the crushing collectivism of certain insects and the greater significance of the individual and the family among the

vertebrates is emphasized. In the birds are to be seen the forerunners of individual, family and group property, the further development of which characterizes the mammals. The chapter on "The First Forms of Property in Man" (pages 179-218) is not very satisfactory, as the list of authorities cited (pp. xiv-xv) would almost necessarily imply. Before an exact statement of the facts of property among primitive peoples can be made, certainly the records of the investigations of the experts of the Bureau of Ethnology, the Jesup North Pacific Expedition and other equally valuable studies concerning some of the least civilized and most primitive people, of the world, must be thoroughly digested. Such researches as that of Dr. Jenks on the wild-rice and its use by the Indians of North America, Boas' brief account of property-marks among the Alaskan Eskimo, etc., are significant here. The relation of "bachelors' houses," puberty-cabins and other isolation places for men and women at various periods of life to the general institutions of primitive man needs more careful study; also the relation between puberty, etc., and art-production as connected with property-sense. According to Petrucci, the uncivilized peoples exhibit essential characteristics already seen in the animals below man: food-reserve, hunting-ground, possession of shelter, all these are grouped according to the same individual, familial, collective forms. With man individual property appears in weapons, tools and clothing, while the family side of property is found in the shelter (dwelling house) and the collective or group aspect in the hunting ground and territory exploited, but these distinctions have no impassable limits. The greatest element of perfectibility possessed by primitive man, according to the author, is "the weapon and the tool, which, in the beginning are one and the same." The permanent utilization and the improvement of weapons and tools and the adaptation of clothing as a sort of defense against the environment, sparing at the same time his organic activity, are some of the chief advantages of man over the other animals. Man's hand and its "prolongation" in the tool and weapon made primitive property a fact. Things that are merely transient with the animals have become fixed and permanent with man. Among other things, Petrucci holds that the family is not a social unit, but "a formation *per se*," that social evolution is not bound up with organic evolution, nor is the social phenomenon connected directly with intellectual evolution. In a chart-appendix is given a conspectus of the "comparative sociology of the phenomena of property."

Professor Wodon's "Errors of Method in the Study of Primitive Man" is an incomplete and rather unsuccessful effort to controvert the principal theses in Bücher's *Die Entstehung der Wirtschaft* and *Arbeit und Rhythmus*. The views of Bücher, which are particularly antagonized, are the general theory of the non-economic and non-industrial character of the condition of primitive man (Wodon styles it "economic chaos"); the doctrine of the economic separation of the sexes (Wodon maintains, *e. g.*, that, in the case of the Indians of the Xingu in Brazil, where sex-distinctions in labor are reported to exist, the distribution of work between the sexes is really in correlation with their natural aptitudes; the division of labor in vogue here has nothing in common with the "isolation" of Bücher); and the theory that work has developed out of non-work, play and art having existed before the serious activities to which the name of "work" may be given, while, rhythm has been one of the principal economic factors of evolution. In combatting Bücher, Wodon makes good use of the material in Grosse's *Die Anfänge der Kunst* and *Die Formen der Familie*. According to the author, Bücher's primitive man is "a mere phantom."

less real even than the *homo oeconomicus* of the classic economists," But this contention needs much more proof than is vouchsafed in this small monograph.

The articles of C. Henry and the "Note" of E. Waxweiler are mathematical studies of the sociological problem of the measurement of the intellectual and "energetic" capacities of a given collectivity. The three papers of Henry treat respectively of "the criterium of ir. reducibility of statistical *ensembles*," "The decomposition of pseudo-binomial curves into binomial curves," and "cotes et mesures." Dr. E. Houzé, the author of the monograph on "The Aryan and Anthropo-sociology," is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Brussels, and his aim is to show that the "so-called Aryan" is "not a primitive people, but an invention of the study-room," and that "anthropo-sociology" and its alleged "laws" are based on "fundamental errors, statistical, anatomical, physiological, psychological and historical." In the first part of his study Professor Houzé discusses the "Aryan" from the linguistic, historical, archaeological and anthropological points of view, reaching the conclusion that, after all "there is no *Aryan* question," and that it is absurd to recognize among the various peoples of Europe *one* human type superior to all others and *the* factor in all civilizations." The morphological Aryan does not exist; never has existed; and archaeological search for him is utterly vain. Aryan linguistics is a deceitful thing and has been responsible for many vagaries of "science." Europe has been the scene of the development of interesting forms of human culture, but their inspiration has not been chiefly "Aryan" nor Asiatic. The second part of the monograph is devoted to "anthropology," and in it the author points out that just as all civilizations have been produced by peoples and not by special types, the value of intelligence can never be revealed by examinations of human skulls;—all theories seeking to make psycho-physiological deductions from craniometry are necessarily false. The "pseudo-anthropology" of Lapouge and his school receives special attention in the third section, on "anthropo-sociology," which is styled a futile attempt to mix two distinct sciences. This book is interesting reading for those among ourselves who have added to the "Aryan" by imagining an "Anglo-Saxon" as the goal of his complete development. One is as non-existent as the other, if we believe Houzé.

ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

L'Aggrandissement et la Proximité Apparentes de la Lune à L'Horizon. Ed. Claparède. Archives de Psychologie, 1906, V, 121-146.

Preliminary to presenting his own views Claparède reviews previous theories put forward to account for the fact that the moon appears larger at the horizon than at the zenith.

The theories he discusses and puts aside as false or inadequate are refraction, pupillary dilation, fall of the crystalline lens, comparison, contrast, direction of the glance, overestimation of angles, weakness of peripheral vision, further distance at horizon. The last theory seems to him the most tenable and he explains it in some detail. It depends on the well established law of vision that for a given retinal image the object corresponding to that image seems larger where it is judged more distant. The moon is judged further away at the horizon and hence is seen larger. But against this, Claparède brings forward a series of experiments made by himself, and others by Zoth, showing that to 120 out of 125 persons the moon appears not further away at the horizon but much nearer.

In order to hold the classic explanation and at the same time account for the fact as established by Claparède's experiments that the